In this situation, marketers are faced with a perplexing challenge--how to sell individual products against virtually identical competition. A solution, found by Davidow and Intel, is to be ""a little different"" rather than ""slightly better. Stress the differences which can provide the competitive edge, whatever they may be. To Davidow, marketing is civilized warfare where the victor realizes greater market share for his product. Marketing High Technology explores many of the tried and proven methods of winning at the marketing game. Not for casual reading, Davidow's book is a hard-core marketing manual that is far more readable than most.
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Marketing High Technology - William H. Davidow - كتب Google
A company that fails to surmount one can slow to a halt, even atrophy, for many years. Just surviving such a test usually means only a return to the status quo ante. But to triumph over such a crisis, to turn possible disaster into a resounding victory, can accelerate a company's growth in a burst of sustained business momentum.
Meanwhile, such an unexpected turnabout can demoralize the competition or -- at the very least -- cause considerable discomfort. Winning, beating the odds, converting defeat to victory -- that's the point of marketing. The stories of such marketing coups are our business legends -- what Iacocca did at Chrysler and what Townsend did at Avis.
It is what Apple is trying to do right now in office automation. And it is what Intel had to do in I know, because I was there. My career depended on a single victory. Intel Corporation was founded in by Robert Noyce, the inventor of the integrated circuit, Gordon Moore, a legendary high-technology scientist and business strategist, and Andrew Grove, a now famous manager and executive. Intel owed its success Ben Rosen once called it the most important firm in America to inventive genius, an ability to convert ideas into products such as the famous microprocessor , Grove's dynamic management, and, not least, a talent for developing new markets for its new products.
All those factors combined to give Intel one of the most remarkable starts in American business history. But not all of Intel's success derived from intrinsic strengths. For a long time the company had also benefited from the benign neglect of more powerful firms in the same industry. Like many hot young electronics firms, Intel had focused on new markets, pursuing a path the industry giants had no interest in following.
But the day of reckoning had come. By the mids Intel's achievements had become an embarrassment to its competitors and the target for most of the largest semiconductor manufacturers in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Intel still prospered but was losing ground in some important markets and was threatened in others. Intel once had been the leading supplier of 1,bit "dynamic" RAMs random access memory chips, but had lost that leadership to a start-up company.
We had been unable to regain that momentum. A number of companies also had jumped into the EPROM erasable programmable read only memory chip market and were applying pressure. Finally, by , Intel's strong position in the microprocessor market, though relatively intact, had suffered inroads from a start-up company named Zilog, and from Motorola, the latter a number of times Intel's size.
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By late Intel was under full siege. Such attacks were nothing new to Intel, and the company had won more than its share of battles. But this threat was different in one very important way: The product line in dispute, the model bit microprocessor family, was the linchpin of the entire corporation. A number of multimillion-dollar Intel businesses depended on its success. In particular, the sale of every Intel and its companion chip, the 8-bit , pulled along large numbers of peripheral, memory, and controller chips worth in total ten times as much as the Whenever an sale was lost, the departing customer would frequently turn to the new supplier for those ancillary products.
On top of that, Intel had two very profitable systems businesses dependent upon the success of the Les Vadasz and I had been co-general managers of the microprocessor division in when the was being planned.
Marketing of High-Technology Products and Innovations
At the time we decided to make the product an extension of the then-successful family. That created some design problems, but they were more than counterbalanced, in our opinion, by the resulting access to a large existing software library. The was introduced to the market in As the first high-performance, fully supported bit microprocessor, it had quickly gained the top position in the market, capturing the lead from older and less capable products supplied by Texas Instruments and National Semiconductor.
In response, Zilog and Motorola prematurely announced their own "paper tigers" products that existed only on paper. Customers loved the features of the proposed products and were not too happy about some of the compromises Intel had made, so it was obvious that when and if those microprocessors ever emerged from the drawing boards, they would be a serious threat. Meanwhile, as Intel had grown, the management had reorganized, and I left the microprocessor business to become the general manager of one of Intel's microprocessor-based systems businesses. Needless to say, any success I would have in my new role would be vitally dependent upon the survival of the So I remained in close touch with the 's marketing effort.
The marketing and sales group was suffering from apathy brought on by shattered morale. It was demoralizing to have one customer after the next lecture you about your employer's failures and your competitors' strengths.
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Many customers actually relished the opportunity to stick it to the famous Intel. Some of the younger marketing people couldn't take the humiliation. It was easier to work on other projects. Being abused by customers -- and even Intel's own sales force -- wasn't fun. Management encouragement had been ineffective at correcting what was becoming a destructive situation.
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In late November Don Buckout, an Intel field engineer on Long Island, sent management an incisive and desperate eight-page telex. The discussion of Buckout's telex at the executive staff meeting the following Tuesday couldn't have been more unpleasant. By the end of it I had either volunteered or been asked by Grove to run a marketing task force charged with solving the problem.
That was the beginning of Operation Crush. We met continuously for three days. Among the "volunteers" were Jim Lally, the general manager of board products; Rich Bader, one of Jim's product managers; Dave House, the general manager of the microprocessor division; Jeff Katz, the marketing manager for microprocessors; Casey Powell, the regional manager to whom Buckout reported; and Regis McKenna, Silicon Valley's lop marketing consultant.
That was the first thing we did right. We did not delegate the job. I appreciate that this runs counter to the principles in most textbooks on management and that many managers become trapped following such a path, but in the current crisis delegating responsibility had already failed.
And, I would argue, the great marketing crusades of the past were led by the top people in the company: Lee Iacocca and Avis's Robert Townsend, to name two. The first thing the group did was agree on the problem. That wasn't hard. There were three of us in the race: Motorola was going to be first, Zilog second, and Intel was headed for obscurity. All of us agreed that if we whipped Motorola, we would win.
For that reason we made our goal not simply regaining market share but restoring Intel's preeminence in the market. In the semiconductor business, the only market share you really care about is the one you maintain when the market is mature. To accomplish that, a firm must convince sufficient numbers of customers to "design in" that is, integrate your chip into their products. So the task force established a goal of achieving two thousand "design wins" by the end of That was the second thing we did right.
We had set a shockingly high goal. Knowledgeable observers thought a few hundred wins more reasonable.
We decided that every salesman could get one win a month. By simple arithmetic, the number two thousand fell out.
Chapter 1. Introduction
We trusted our people to come through. As the discussion developed, we increasingly talked about what our real objective was. It was Jim Lally who articulated the need to "crush the competition.
It captured the essence of our attitude. It also left no doubt about the single-mindedness of our purpose. The code name Crush was never supposed to be made public. Roger Borovoy, the corporate counsel, was concerned about the implications of such a loaded word. But the name already was spreading like wildfire throughout the company.
Everyone loved it. We had been kicked around enough; Crush signaled that we now meant to stand our ground and fight aggressively. And it meant we were going to win.
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